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This paper evaluates Nigeria’s commitment to ending gas flaring within the context of the 
global quest for zero routine flaring by 2030. Nigeria has adopted a combination of strategies 
since 1969 to achieve zero flaring. Within this period, several unrealized flare-out dates were 
set. Several factors are responsible for the non-realization of the flare-out targets. These 
include Nigeria’s weak institutional framework, the unattractiveness of economic payoffs 
associated with investing in gas-gathering infrastructure and the unwillingness of international 
oil companies (IOCs) to readjust their operations to accommodate zero gas flaring. Using data 
from secondary sources, the paper locates the non-realization of the various flare-out dates 
between legal enactments and economic permutations. A related factor is the huge capital 
outlay required to develop gas-gathering infrastructure vis-à-vis the uncertainty surrounding 
the gas market in Nigeria. The paper recommends the adoption of a holistic implementation 







Gas flaring, which is the disposal of gaseous and liquid hydrocarbons through combustion at 
oil and gas production and processing sites, constitutes a serious global problem (Johnson 
et al., 2001; Anomohanran, 2012; Huang & Fu, 2016). Gas flaring has been designated a 
monumental economic waste as it leads to multibillion dollar losses to the global economy. 
According to World Bank sources, gas flaring cost the global economy an estimated US$20 
billion in 2018 (PWC, 2019). Gas flaring has also been implicated in causing environmental 
catastrophes manifesting in health complications, low life expectancy and widespread 
poverty (Hassan & Kouhy, 2013; Emam, 2015; Giwa et al., 2017). In spite of these 
negativities, oil companies still dispose of associated gas in the course of oil production 
though flaring. The basic justificatory reasons often associated with gas flaring include the 
prohibitive cost of efficient gas-gathering infrastructure, remoteness of production sites, and 
lack of pipelines and other gas transportation infrastructure (Huang & Fu, 2016; Ojijiagwo et 
al., 2016). Additional, safety reasons have been indicated. Experts contend that flaring is 
warranted at times to protect against the dangers of over-pressurizing industrial plant 
equipment (Huang & Fu, 2016). Apart from flaring gas for safety purposes, which is often an 
occasional occurrence, other reasons for flaring gas are unjustifiable. It is for this reason, 
therefore, that the global community initiated the global gas flaring reduction (GGFR) 




Nigeria subscribes to the global efforts to stop gas flaring. The country’s foremost efforts at 
stopping gas flaring started in 1969 when it enacted the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) 
Regulations Decree. Specifically, regulation 43 of the decree required oil companies to send 
proposals to the minister of petroleum about their gas utilization plans not later than five 
years after commencing production. However, through the instrumentality of the Associated 
Gas Reinjection Regulation Act of 1979, gas flaring became illegal in Nigeria on 1st January 
1984. Since then, Nigeria has set several dates for the termination of gas flaring, which 
never materialized. However, appreciable progress in terms of reduction in the volume of 
flared gas has been recorded since 2010. Thus, from flaring about 98.98 percent of 
associated gas in 1958 when oil production started, the figure steadily came down, 
especially since 2010 from 19.32 to 11.04 percent as at 2018. (Ologunorisa, 2001; DPR, 
2018). 
 
Although a number of papers have examined gas flaring as well as associated legal and 
regulatory frameworks in Nigeria, none has explicitly explored the dynamics and 
interconnections between legal instruments and economic permutations. Additionally, there 
appears to be little or no attention to the link between economic factors and the recent 
downward trends in the volume of flared gas in Nigeria. The consideration of these issues 
constitutes the contribution of this paper. In evaluating the zero gas flaring efforts of Nigeria, 
the paper finds that Nigeria has deployed two major strategies in its quest to actualize zero 
gas flaring. Initially, emphasis centered on the enactment of legislative instruments. Thus, 
several laws were made which ultimately failed to induce compliant behavior from the IOCs. 
The IOCs underpinned their inability to meet the flare-out deadlines on technological and 
infrastructural deficits and the enormous costs associated with remedying these deficits. 
Thus, the Nigerian government evolved a complementary strategy to incentivize compliance 
by providing tax holidays and encouraging the establishment of gas-gathering infrastructure 
(Ejiogu, 2013; Jaillet & Laurent, 2017). The paper also finds that the underlying reasons for 
the failure of the various flare-out deadlines are domiciled, not in the legal instruments but in 
the primacy of economic permutations. While appropriate legislation is relevant, it is the 
provision of incentives and the deepening of the economic environment that will guarantee a 
sustainable march to ending gas flaring in Nigeria.  
 
Nigeria’s Oil Sector: A Theoretical Underpinning 
 
Crude oil production started modestly in Nigeria in 1958 in two oil fields - one at Oloibiri and 
the other at Afam - that yielded some 5,100 barrels per day (Steyn, 2009; Duru, 2014). From 
this modest beginning, Nigeria’s oil sector has expanded in leaps and bounds with about 606 
oilfields (comprising 355 onshore and 251 offshore) and about 5,284 oil wells all over the 
Niger Delta region (Anifowose et al., 2014; Eke, 2016). From these oil fields, Nigeria has 
been producing millions of barrels of oil that peaked at some point at 2.5 million barrels per 
day (mbpd). Nwozor et al. (2019, p. 9) have pointed out that with the exception of the period 
that Niger Delta militants disrupted oil production activities between 2004 and 2009, 
Nigeria’s average daily oil production since 1999 has hovered between 2.1 and 2.5 mbpd.  
 
Nigeria is a major player in the global oil industry because of its natural hydrocarbon 
endowments, the quality of its crude oil and its potential capacity to produce beyond OPEC 
quota. With regard to the quality of crude oil, Nigeria is known to produce high value, light 
crude oil characterized by low sulphur content. Nigeria is ranked the largest oil producer in 
Africa and among the top fifteen in the world. According to OPEC’s 2018 data, Nigeria has 
proven crude oil reserves of 36,972 billion barrels, thus, making it the 10th country with the 
largest crude oil reserves in the world (OPEC, 2019). Despite these huge crude oil holdings, 
the Nigerian government still aspires to expand the volume of its proven oil reserves to 40 
billion barrels by 2020. It plans to achieve this expansion by adding one billion barrels year-
on-year till 2020 (Jeremiah, 2018; Nwozor et al., 2020). In addition to huge crude oil 
reserves, Nigeria also has natural gas in abundance, which places it among the top 10 
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countries with vast natural gas deposits. As at the end of 2018, Nigeria’s proven natural gas 
reserves stood at 5,675 billion standard cubic meters (OPEC, 2019). All these hydrocarbon 
holdings are concentrated in the Niger Delta region. Despite these endowments, the region 
is characterized by a paradox of lack in the midst of plenty. While the Niger Delta produces 
immense oil wealth for Nigeria, its people are victims of environmental degradation from land 
pollution, gas flaring and indiscriminate disposal of oil production wastes into the water body 
(UNDP, 2006; Ite et al., 2018; Nwozor, 2020). This oil-induced alienation has been at the 
roots of the diverse manifestations of criminality and violence that characterize the region 
(Obi, 2010; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2012).  
 
In trying to appraise gas flaring in Nigeria within the context of its legal and regulatory 
frameworks, this paper uses a modification of the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH). The key 
thrust of PHH is that the relatively lax environmental regulations in developing countries 
underpin their attractiveness to pollution-intensive industries since it will provide an escape 
route for them to avoid paying costly pollution control costs (He, 2006; Zheng & Shi, 2017). 
All the major players in Nigeria’s oil sector are IOCs whose operations elsewhere show 
massive investments in gas-gathering infrastructure because of stringent anti-pollution laws. 
Thus, noncompliance to zero-flaring laws in Nigeria depicts double standards, which is 
driven by the use of their enormous financial weight to exploit the lax implementation 
system. 
Contextualizing the Political Economy of Gas Flaring in Nigeria 
 
Gas flaring is incentivized by cost calculations by oil companies. In other words, they engage 
in gas flaring to reduce operational costs, often to the detriment of the people and the 
environment. Crude oil has associated gas, which must be separated at the point of 
exploitation. Three standard options are available to oil companies namely: re-injecting the 
gas to the ground for future reuse, deploying gas-capturing equipment to harvest gas for 
domestic and commercial purposes, and flaring the gas into the atmosphere (Agboola et al., 
2011). The last option, gas flaring, is quite easy and therefore attractive to oil companies. 
The negative impacts of gas flaring, ranging from pollution, associated economic waste and 
destruction of biodiversity, led Environmental Rights Action et al (2005); UNDP (2006) to 
describe it as a human rights, environmental and economic monstrosity. Gas flaring has 
been part and parcel of Nigeria’s oil industry from the inception of oil exploitation in 1958. At 
first, it was not considered a problem because of general ignorance about its negative 
environmental impacts. But with the advent of new knowledge about its negative impacts on 
the environment and economy, concerns began to arise. In the first decade of oil production, 
it was estimated that Nigeria flared about 98.98 percent of its gas (Ologunorisa, 2001). 
 
Gas flaring became an issue from 1969 when the Nigerian government outlawed it and 
directed IOCs operating in the country to comply within five years, by taking steps towards 
the utilization of gas being flared. This target was unmet by the IOCs prompting the Nigerian 
government to set another target for 1984 which also fell flat in stopping the menace. The 
enactment of the Associated Gas Re-injection Act in 1979 formalized its determination to 
end gas flaring. The Act provided a 5-year moratorium for IOCs to stop gas flaring. It also 
introduced penalties for non-compliance. Thus, by virtue of this law, gas flaring became 
illegal from January 1, 1984. It has been contended by scholars that the penalty regime 
specified by the Act was not deterrent enough to induce compliance (Agboola et al., 2011; 
Edu, 2011; Mohammed, 2016). Table 1 below shows the top ten gas flaring countries in the 
world. Nigeria is ranked 7th. There is a progressive reduction in gas flaring in Nigeria, 
although at a very slow pace. 
 
Table 1: Top ten gas flaring countries by volumes, 2015 -2019 (billion cubic meters) 
S/
N 











































5 Venezuela  9.33 9.35 7.00 8.22 9.54 1.32 
6 Algeria 9.13 9.10 8.80 9.01 9.34 0.33 
7 Nigeria  7.66 7.31 7.65 7.44 7.83 0.39 
8 Libya  2.61 2.35 3.91 4.67 5.12 0.45 
9 Mexico  5.00 4.78 3.79 3.89 4.48 0.59 
10 Oman  2.43 2.82 2.60 2.54 2.63 0.10 
 Global Total  146 148 141 145 150  5.0 
Source: World Bank, 2020 
 
The non-actualization of the target of 1984 led the Nigerian government to set several other 
deadlines that never led to an abatement in gas flaring in Nigeria. Table 2 below shows a 
snapshot of various deadlines set by the Nigerian government for zero flaring. At the 
expiration of each of these deadlines, the excuse for non-realization centered on the 
expensive nature of gas-gathering infrastructure needed to effect gas utilization and re-
injection (Ejiogu, 2013). Thus, the government was forced not only to repeatedly postpone 
the deadlines but also adopt an incentive approach.  A major lapse in government’s 
approach to zero gas flaring has been the absence of a coordinated platform to pursue it. 
Added to this is lack of synergy among stakeholders. For instance, this lack of synergy 
manifested in 2009 when Nigeria’s Senate, the executive arm and oil companies set 
conflicting deadlines. The Senate set December 2010, the executive arm fixed December 
2011 and oil companies slated 2013 (Ebiri & Akpan, 2018). Interestingly, none of these 
deadlines resulted in zero gas flaring. 
 
Table 2: A snapshot of flare-out targets in Nigeria 
Year of policy 
document 
Moratorium Deadline for Zero 
Flaring 
Outcome 
1969 5 years 1974 Not achieved  
1979 5 years 1st January 1984 Not achieved 
1984 1 year 1st January 1985 Not achieved 
1990 14 years 1st January 2004 Not achieved 
1999 Additional 2 years 1st January 2006 Not achieved 
2008 2 years 2010/2012 Not achieved 
2018 2 years 2020 In progress 
Source: Reconstructed from multiple documents 
 
Nigeria has been a major gas flarer. According to Gboyega et al. (2011), in 1991, when the 
world average for flared gas was 4 percent, Nigeria‘s rate was 76 percent which accounted 
for 13 percent of the world‘s total volume of flared gas. At this point, it was second only to 
Russian Federation. But since 2010, there has been significant reduction in the volume of 
flared gas. Between 2008 and 2017, it is estimated that Nigeria flared some 4.498 trillion 
standard cubic feet (tscf) of gas (Ejoh, 2018). It is further estimated that Nigeria flares 
between 130 to 150 billion cubic meters of gas annually. This flared gas not only 
contaminates the environment with 400 million tons of CO2 but also contributes massively to 
global warming and climate change (Fawole et al., 2016; Soltanieh et al., 2016; Giwa et al., 
2017). Research about the effect of gas flaring has linked it to greenhouse gases, precursor 
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gases, volatile organic chemicals (VOCs), polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH), 
particulate matter (PM) and black carbon. All of these gases have serious implications for 
the global environment and human health (Fawole et al., 2016; Giwa et al., 2017). 
 
Beyond environmental degradation, gas flaring constitutes a multi-billion dollar waste to the 
economy. The Nigerian government announced in December 2017 that there were 178 
active gas-flaring sites in the country (Eboh, 2017a). However, recent reports from Gas Flare 
Tracker, a data portal that monitors live data of active flare sites within countries, indicated 
the existence of 222 active gas-flaring sites across the Niger Delta region (Budgit, 2018). 
Research has shown that from these sites over 250 identified toxins are released. 
Undoubtedly, these toxins contribute to greenhouse gases and have detrimental effects on 
human and animal health as well as plant growth (World Bank, 2004; Soltanieh et al, 2016; 
Fawole et al., 2016). The bottom line is that gas flaring in Nigeria has had widespread 
impoverishing consequences, particularly in the Niger Delta region. According to World Bank 
sources, flared gas can potentially deliver up to 750 billion kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity, 
which could meet the energy needs of Nigeria alongside many neighboring African countries 
(World Bank, n.d; Hassan & Kouhy, 2013). 
 
The wider economic cost of gas flaring can be reconstructed by available facts. A ten-year 
estimate of revenue loss through gas flaring, that is, between 1999 and 2009, was put  at 
about US$ 188 billion at an average of US$17billion per annum (Anomohanran, 2012). The 
NNPC recently disclosed that oil companies in Nigeria flare 700 million scf per day which 
could potentially generate 5,000 megawatts of electricity per day or fetch N868 million into 
the state treasury (calculation based on US$4 per 1000 scf and exchange rate of N310 to a 
dollar) (Eboh, 2018). It is estimated that over 30 million residents of the Niger Delta region 
are under health, livelihood and survival threats.  To lend credence to the destructive effects 
of gas flaring, several studies have linked serious health challenges in the region to 
exposure to over 250 toxins released into the atmosphere (World Bank, 2004; Environmental 
Rights Action et al., 2005; Gobo et al., 2009; Ana et al., 2009; Buzcu-Guven & Harriss, 2012; 
Hassan & Kouhy, 2013; Ejiogu, 2013; Giwa et al, 2017; Budgit, 2018). The result is that life 
expectancy at birth in the Niger Delta region is now 40 years as opposed to the national 
average of 52.9 years (CBN, 2015; Giwa et al., 2017).  Several studies have also 
demonstrated the negative effects of gas flaring on agriculture, which is a key source of 
livelihood in the Niger Delta (Ologunorisa, 2001; Environmental Rights Action et al., 2005; 
UNDP, 2006; Gboyega et al., 2011; Nduka et al., 2016). Farmers in the Niger Delta 
communities regularly experience acid-like damage to their crops.  Fayiga et al. (2017) 
attribute the damage to the acid rain from the dissolution of high ozone (O3) levels and sulfur 
dioxide. A more serious accusation against IOCs is underreporting of flare statistics. Ibe 
Kachikwu, Nigeria’s former Minister of State for Petroleum Resources estimated that Nigeria 
is losing between US$500 million and US$1 billion in revenues that would have accrued as 
flare penalties due to the falsification of gas flare data by the IOCs (Umoru et al., 2016). 
Gas flaring in Nigeria has wider implications in Africa. Gas flaring has been recognized as a 
major driver of air pollution. It is estimated that Nigeria accounts for 40 percent of all gas 
flared in Africa (Budgit, 2018). A 2016 study implicated air pollution in health complications 
leading to premature deaths in Africa. According to Roy (2016), household air pollution and 
ambient particulate matter pollution led to the death of approximately 712,482 people in 
2013 in Africa.  The cost of pollution to African economies was estimated at US$215 billion a 
year for outdoor air pollution and US$232 billion for indoor pollution (Roy, 2016). To deal 
with the challenge of gas flaring, Nigeria has, in recent times, subscribed to global efforts to 
enthrone a flare-free environment.  
 
Nigeria is a party to both the “global gas flaring reduction” partnership (GGFR) and “zero 
routine flaring by 2030” initiative. Both initiatives target different angles of how to deal with 
gas flaring. The GGFR partnership is a World Bank-led public-private initiative that 
comprises national and international oil companies, national governments and international 
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institutions with the objective of eliminating associated gas flaring by sharing best practices 
and implementing country specific programs. The zero routine flaring by 2030 initiative has 
the singular aim of mobilizing all stakeholders towards ending routine gas flaring by 2030. 
Thus, the zero routine flaring by 2030 initiative represents a common platform for all 
stakeholders such as governments, oil companies, and development institutions to 
cooperate and work together towards the elimination of routine gas flaring not later than 
2030 (Okafor & Aniche, 2016).  
 
A key answer to flaring in Nigeria is more productive utilization of gas through the 
development of wider markets. It would boost industrialization through an expansion in the 
electric power consumption (KWh per capita) which is abysmally too low at 144 KWh vis-à-
vis the global average of 3,127 KWh. Additionally, it would save the country from needless 
human loss through gas flare-related fatalities in the Niger Delta region, which has been put 
at 200 persons monthly (Umoru, 2017). Thus, the general implication of the high gas flaring 
in Nigeria is its tendency to contribute to the country’s continued underdevelopment as well 
as jeopardize its prospects of meeting the sustainable development goals (SDGs). 
 
The Architecture of Legal and Regulatory Framework to Stem Gas Flaring in Nigeria  
 
The complex nature of gas flare question in Nigeria is not a result of the dearth of legal 
instruments for its stoppage or reduction to a globally acceptable benchmark. It is essentially 
connected to the intricate systemic hurdles that make enforcement politically and 
economically challenging. Since 1969, the Nigerian government has been on the issue of 
gas flaring without achieving zero flaring yet. The lesson learnt from the Nigerian situation is 
that economic considerations command ascendance over political directives. Jaillet and 
Laurent (2017) have pointed out that the decision by oil companies to flare gas is mainly a 
question of economics.  Scholars have identified two major scenarios that ordinarily 
discourage oil companies from investing in gas-gathering infrastructure. The first scenario is 
where gas exists in small and variable quantities, which might make investments more 
difficult to amortize. The second scenario is where it is economically costly to transport gas 
due to low gas pressure at the wellhead or remoteness of sites (Soltanieh et al., 2016; Jaillet 
& Laurent, 2017).  
 
From an economic perspective, what motivates or demotivates oil companies from investing 
in gas-gathering infrastructure is the permutation of the profitability of compliance vis-à-vis 
noncompliance. However, a combination of stringent legal and political conditions, stiff 
penalties and the political courage to implement state policies would most likely induce 
compliance. Thus, what made economic calculations the sole basis for compliance or 
noncompliance by IOCs in Nigeria could be linked to the seeming inefficiency of the relevant 
regulatory agencies. As Anejionu, Ahiarammunnah et al. (2015) have argued, the relevance 
of law lies in its capacity to impose responsible attitudes and behaviors.    
 
Several pieces of legislation with flare-out deadlines have been enacted in Nigeria since 
1969 (see Table 3). The first directive in 1969, which was more like an executive order, 
envisaged gas flaring to end within five years. Based on this directive, gas flaring would have 
stopped by 1974. However, gas flaring continued unabatedly. The non-realization of the 
1974 date led to the enactment of a new legislative instrument, the Associated Gas 
Reinjection Act of 1979. The major objective of this Act was to ensure responsible utilization 
of associated gas by IOCs. Thus, the Act compelled IOCs to submit both preliminary and 
comprehensive plans for the implementation of gas reinjection. It also criminalized gas 
flaring by stipulating penalties for noncompliance. The Act set the cutoff date for compliance 
as 1st January 1984. Notwithstanding the cutoff date, section 3 provided an exclusionary 
caveat that gas could only be flared with the written permission and authorization of the 
Minister of Petroleum based on certain conditions. The conditions listed must satisfy the 
Minister that gas utilization or reinjection was either inappropriate or infeasible. The 
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punishment prescribed by the Act was the forfeiture of the concession granted for the field in 
question as well as fines. As a result of the complaints by the IOCs, the government shifted 
the deadline from 1st January 1984 and to 1st January 1985. Yet, no progress was made in 
abating gas flaring.  
 
In 1984, the Nigerian Government amended the regulations through the Associated Gas Re-
injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations. The regulations appeared to be a step 
backward in the quest for zero flaring (Hassan & Kouhy, 2013; Onyi-Ogelle, 2017). The 
regulations took the wind off the sail of the ship for zero flaring by expanding conditions for 
the issuance of certificates for continued flaring of gas. These conditions provided a wide 
legal latitude that made it easy for the IOCs to continue to flare gas. For instance, the IOCs 
could flare gas if they could demonstrate: one, gas utilization rate of more than 75 percent; 
two, the presence of more than 15 percent impurities in gas produced; and three, 
interruption due to equipment failure among others. The IOCs could also flare gas where the 
gas-to-oil ratio of the field was less than 3,500 SCF /bbl, hence not technically advisable to 
re-inject the gas in that field or where the Minister deemed fit. The direct implication of the 
1984 regulations which commenced on 1st January 1985 was that 55 percent or 86 of the 
then 155 oil fields were exempted from the anti-flaring provision (Orji, 2012; Hassan & 
Kouhy, 2013; Onyi-Ogelle, 2017). The regulations also reviewed the penalty for 
contravention, which made it so insignificant that IOCs were prepared to flare and pay the 
penalty rather than utilize or re-inject gas (Hassan & Kouhy, 2013; Ejiogu, 2013; Onyi-
Ogelle, 2017). 
 
Table 3: Key Legislations and Regulations towards Zero-Gas Flaring 
Legislation/Regulations  Year   
Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation Decree 1969  
Associated Gas Reinjection Regulation Act 1979  
Associated Gas Reinjection (Continued Flaring of Gas) 
Regulation)  
1984  
The Nigeria LNG (Fiscal Incentive Guarantee and 
Assurances) Decree (FIGAD), Decree no 30 
1990  
Sections 11 & 12 of Petroleum Profit Tax Act (PPTA), 
Cap. 354 L.F.N. 1990/Cap. P13 L.F.N. 2004. 
Section 28(9), Finance (Miscellaneous Taxation 
Provisions) Decree No. 18 1998 
1990  
West African Gas Pipeline Project (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act.  
2004  
Nigerian Gas Master Plan 2008  
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development 
Act  
2010  
Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) 
Regulations,  
2018  
Source: Compiled from various sources by the authors 
 
The subsequent dates fixed by the Nigerian government to end gas flaring such as 2004, 
2006, 2010, and 2012 all failed to materialize. An important lesson that the country 
apparently learnt from these failures was that ending gas flaring would require more than 
laws. The IOCs demonstrated more willingness to pay penalties than invest in gas-gathering 
infrastructure necessary to kick-start the reduction of gas flaring. The important lessons 
learnt from the serial failures to realize flare-out dates led to a shift in emphasis. This shift 
consisted of moving from passing legislation to making policies towards infrastructural 
development to facilitate the utilization of flared gas. The twin strategies of the government 
included the evolvement of domestic gas utilization policy anchored on creating new 
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investment opportunities in the domestic gas sector and export-oriented gas policy aimed at 
the West African sub-region and the world at large.  
 
Table 4: Key Regulatory Agencies for Gas Flare Regulation 
Regulatory Agency Major Operational Instrument  
Ministry of Petroleum Resources  The major government organ with powers to 
articulate and implement policies relating to 
petroleum and other mineral resources, with the 
exception of solid minerals. 
Federal Ministry of Environment  The EIA Act No. 86 of 1992; the Environmental 
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry 
in Nigeria (EGASPIN) 2001 
Department of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR) 
Formerly the Petroleum Inspectorate and renamed 
the DPR in 1985. EGASPIN 2001 
National Environmental Standards 
and Regulations Enforcement 
Agency (NESREA) 
NESREA (Establishment) Act of 2007. 
(NESREA Act, published in FRN Official Gazette No. 
92 Vol. 94 of July 31, 2007, repealed the FEPA Act 
Cap F. 10 LFN 2004.) 
Source: Compiled from various legislations by the authors 
 
The domestic gas utilization policy led to the enactment of projects such as the Nigerian 
Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) Project of 1990, Associated Gas Framework Agreement of 
1990, Nigerian Gas Master Plan of 2008, Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act 2010, and more recently, Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) 
Regulations, 2018, which spearheads the Nigerian Gas Flare Commercialization Programme 
(NGFCP). The quest to find export markets for Nigeria’s associated and non-associated gas 
birthed three key export-oriented gas projects; namely, the West African Gas Pipeline 
(WAGP) Project which connects Benin, Togo and Ghana; the proposed Trans-Sahara 
pipeline project (to transport gas to Europe through Algeria); and the proposed gas network 
to supply gas to Equatorial Guinea (Agbonifo, 2016; Jaillet & Laurent, 2017).  
 
 
The Quest for Zero Gas Flaring: Appraising Abatement Efforts  
 
Nigeria has been on the quest to stop gas flaring since 1969. Undoubtedly, the country has 
made significant progress in reducing gas flaring. However, if it is juxtaposed to the country’s 
overall aspiration to stop gas flaring as captured in its various legislations and policies, there 
is still a large room for progress. Orji (2012) has attributed the modest achievement in the 
area of gas flaring and oil-related pollution to factors such as inadequate funding of 
regulatory bodies, inadequate human and institutional capacity, corruption, and regulatory 
chaos due to conflicting and overlapping functions of regulatory agencies. Other factors that 
have militate against the realization of zero gas flaring are absence of constitutional 
guarantee of the right to a clean environment, weak judicial system and the unwillingness of 
regulatory agencies to enforce court rulings (Orji, 2012).  
 
The failure of Nigeria to stop gas flaring up to this time is characteristic of policy failures in 
other spheres of national development. There are technological, economic and institutional 
obstacles against Nigeria’s quest for a flare-free environment. However, the greatest 
obstacle is the lack of political will to follow through with regulations. Nigeria’s oil sector is 
filled with several government-backed regulatory agencies (see Table 4). But these 
regulatory institutions generally lack the necessary operational independence as a result of 
undue political interference. They are routinely manipulated by political leaders whose 
interests are often at variance with national goals.  A number of examples will buttress the 




The Associated Gas Re-Injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations of 1984 liberalized 
and monetized gas flaring, which made it economically viable for oil companies to flare gas 
rather than harness or conserve it through utilization or re-injection schemes. Thus, despite 
the illegality of gas flaring, a stamp of legality was affixed to it. Therefore, when a Federal 
High Court in Jonah Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) & Ors made 
a ruling declaring gas flaring illegal and ordered its stoppage, no official effort was made to 
enforce the ruling (Orji, 2012).  
 
From all indications, the trend of the penalty regime for gas flaring has been too mild to 
induce investment in gas-gathering infrastructure. For instance, between 1985 and 1992, the 
fine was 20 kobo (US$0.22) per 1,000 scf of gas flared. This was slightly increased to 50 
kobo (US$0.029) between 1992 and 1997. The fine was increased to N10.00 (US$ 0.0276) 
and was supposed to apply for a ten-year period from 1998 to 2008. However, N10 is still 
being charged despite the enactment of a more realistic fine of US$3.50 per 1,000 scf. The 
total loss suffered by Nigeria based on US$3.50 and cumulative flared gas of 4.085 trillion 
scf between April 2008 and October 2016 was put at US$14.298 billion (Eboh, 2017b). 
 
Another demonstration of lack of political will is institutional incapacity as a result of poor 
funding of regulatory agencies. On paper, the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
has the authority to suspend or remove licenses and permits of IOCs in the event of non-
compliance with gas flaring and venting regulations. However, in practice, lack of operational 
resources at the DPR makes it difficult for the agency to conduct regular inspections on 
facilities especially those in remote and insecure locations. As a result, they rely on feedback 
from IOCs to generate working data (Orji, 2012).    
 
Technological barriers, especially the absence of modern production and processing 
infrastructure, are contributory to the intractability of gas flaring in Nigeria. This is mainly 
because the IOCs have been unwilling to invest in such infrastructure. The unwillingness of 
IOCs to commit resources towards ending gas flaring is not unconnected with the weak 
market for gas, ineffective implementation of laws on gas flaring by relevant regulatory 
agencies, poor incentives and continued attractiveness of flaring as a result of poor penalty 
regime (UNDP, 2006; Hassan & Kouhy, 2013). Table 5 presents the key impediments to 
realizing zero gas flaring so far. 
 
Table 5: Key Barriers to Realizing Zero Flaring 
Technological factors Market/Economic factors Institutional factors 
Infrastructural incapacity: 
absence of infrastructure for 
production and processing 
Low domestic price regime 
for gas 
Inefficient judicial system. 
Weak enforcement of 
environmental laws  
Deficiencies in gas metering Long distances between 
production and potential 
markets 
Conflict of interest resulting 
from Joint venture 




Limited and insufficient 
market for gas and its related 
products 
Inefficient system for state 




High cost of constructing 
needed gas pipelines 





performance equipment for 
Doubts about commercial 
viability of natural gas; Poor 




fractional separation of 
associated gas 
 
payment records in 
downstream markets. 
Sources: Loe & Ladehaug, 2012; Orji, 2012; Hassan & Kouhy, 2013 
 
Although Nigeria has not realized zero gas flaring, it has made modest progress as attested 
by the steady downward trend in the volume of flared gas since 2010. For instance, while the 
percentage of gas flared as opposed to gas produced was 19.32 percent in 2010, the figure 
consistently reduced year-on-year to 10.65 percent in 2016 before going up in 2017 to 11.05 
percent and down to 11.04 percent in 2018 (DPR, 2018).  Table 6 below shows the trend. It 
is important to note that the flare data by Nigeria’s Department of Petroleum Resources 
contrasted with the data presented by the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
Partnership (GGFR) on Nigeria (DPR 2018; World Bank, 2020). The most likely explanation 
for the seeming discrepancies in the data could be linked to the methods adopted by both 
institutions to generate them. However, the most important point to note is that the data by 
both institutions showed a steady reduction in the percentage of flared gas in Nigeria. 
 
 
Table 6:  Data of Gas Produced vis-à-vis Gas Flared, 2010-2016 
Year  Gas Produced 
(mscf)* 
(million) 




2010 2,819.68 544.72 19.32 
2011  2,966.65 503.94 16.99 
2012 2,996.03 465.25 15.53 
2013  2,811.98 427.97 15.22 
2014  3,048.54 393.83 12.92 
2015 3,003.17 330.93 11.02 
2016  2,711.80 288.91 10.65 
2017 2,937.93 324.19 11.05 
2018 2,909.14 321.29 11.04 
*mscf: million standard cubic feet.  Source: DPR 2018, p. 57. 
 
From available evidence, two interrelated factors appeared to have been majorly 
instrumental in the downward trend of the volume of flared gas in Nigeria. The first is the 
reduction in the number of flare sites. Using the Moderate Resolution Imaging 
Spectroradiometer (MODIS) flare detection technique in their study of the Niger Delta region 
between 2000 and 2014, Anejionu, Blackburn et al. (2015) detected 271 flare sites (190 
onshore and 81 offshore). There were variations in the volume of flared gas during the 
period. Flaring activities peaked at 36 bcm in 2005 before declining between 2006 and 2009 
with a brief increase from 2010 to 2011, followed by steady decline to the present levels 
(Anejionu, Blackburn et al., 2015). The reduction in the number of flare sites is attributed to 
three factors. The first is a decrease in the number of active flare sites through 
decommissioning and insecurity orchestrated by the Niger Delta militants. The second is a 
reduction in the rate of gas combustion as a result of reduced production from the wells 
contributing to flow stations. The third is the implementation of alternative strategies for 
dealing with associated gas by IOCs. 
 
The last factor needs a little elaboration. The development of critical gas-gathering 
infrastructure by both the Nigerian government and IOCs is undoubtedly instrumental to the 
reduction in the volume of flared gas. This development expanded Nigeria’s gas utilization 
profile. Apart from installing associated gas-gathering infrastructure at various oilfields in the 
Niger Delta by IOCs, several liquefaction facilities were established. For instance, in 1999, 
the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas facility at Bonny Island came on stream. This was 
11 
 
subsequently followed by the commissioning of additional gas plants at Kwale/Okpai in 
2006, Okoloma in 2006 and Escravos in 2014 by Agip Oil Company, Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (SPDC) and Chevron respectively (Anejionu, Blackburn et al., 2015; 
Agbonifo, 2016; Jaillet & Laurent, 2017). Additionally, investments were made in the 
expansion of pipelines. Networks of pipelines to supply gas to various end-users in the 
electricity and industrial sectors were commissioned thereby deepening the domestic gas 
market  
 




Source: Designed by the authors from various policy documents. 
 
Currently, Nigeria is working on consolidating the downward trend in the volume of flared 
gas. To actualize it, the government has evolved a strategic plan aimed at stopping gas 
flaring by 2020 as depicted in Figure 1 above. Although laudable, the plan has been 
criticized by experts as unattainable due to a combination of reasons, especially the absence 
of a clear-cut roadmap to its realization. But it remains to be seen in the years ahead 






This paper appraised the legal and regulatory frameworks enacted to drive the abatement of 
gas flaring in Nigeria. Since 1969, Nigeria never lacked the necessary legal instruments to 
combat gas flaring as it consistently evolved a plethora of laws to deal with the gas flare 
menace. However, none of the laws and the accompanying flare-out deadlines ever 
materialized in stopping gas flaring. The reasons for the non-realization of the flare-out 
targets are many. The major ones include initial unwillingness of IOCs to invest in gas-
gathering infrastructure, systemic and institutional lapses, and the general inefficiency of 
regulatory agencies due to underfunding and political interference. As a result, for decades 
Nigeria was the second biggest gas-flaring state in the world after the Russian Federation. 
The lax system that characterized the implementation of relevant flare-out laws aligns with 
  
Compulsory gas 
utilization plan to 
accompany the 
submission of field 
development plans 
(FDPs) to DPR. 
Such plans must be 




Steady reduction of 
existing flares through a 
combination of targeted 
policy interventions in 




Re-invigoration of the 
flare penalty through the 
2016 Nigeria Gas Flare 
Commercialization 
Programme (NGFCP) 
Pursue legislation to 
place ban on gas flaring 
via the recent Flare Gas 




the pollution haven hypothesis, especially within the context of the double standards in the 
operational modalities of IOCs.  
 
Since 2010, Nigeria has made some remarkable progress by sliding down from second to 
seventh position among the biggest gas-flaring states in the world. The progress recorded 
did not stem from new stringent laws. It was also not because the regulatory agencies 
reinvented themselves and became dedicated to their mandates. Rather, the progress is 
correlated to the reconfiguration of the economic arena manifesting in the expansion of 
domestic and external gas markets. Therefore, an important lesson is the primacy of 
economics over legalism in inducing compliance among IOCs. 
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